Chapter 9: Database Security: An Introduction
Contents

1 Introduction to Database Security Issues
2 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
3 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
4 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
5 Encryption & PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
## Contents

1. **Introduction to Database Security Issues**
2. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
3. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
4. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
5. Encryption & PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
Introduction to Database Security Issues (1)

- **Types of Security:**
  - Legal and ethical issues
  - Policy issues
  - System-related issues
  - The need to identify multiple security levels
Introduction to Database Security Issues (2)

- Three Basic Concepts:
  - Authentication: a mechanism that determines whether a user is who he or she claims to be.
  - Authorization: the granting of a right or privilege, which enables a subject to legitimately have access to a system or a system’s objects.
  - Access Control: a security mechanism (of a DBMS) for restricting access to a system’s objects (the database) as a whole.
Introduction to Database Security

Threats:

- Any situation or event, whether intentional or unintentional, that will adversely affect a system and consequently an organization.

Threats to:
- Computer systems
- Databases
Threats to Computer Systems

**Hardware**
- Fire/flood/bombs
- Data corruption due to power loss or surge
- Failure of security mechanisms giving greater access
- Theft of equipment
- Physical damage to equipment
- Electronic interference and radiation

**DBMS and Application Software**
- Failure of security mechanism giving greater access
- Program alteration
- Theft of programs

**Communication networks**
- Wire tapping
- Breaking or disconnection of cables
- Electronic interference and radiation

**Database**
- Unauthorized amendment or copying of data
- Theft of data
- Data corruption due to power loss or surge

**Users**
- Using another person’s means of access
- Viewing and disclosing unauthorized data
- Inadequate Staff training
- Illegal entry by hacker
- Blackmail
- Introduction of viruses

**Programers/Operators**
- Creating trapdoors
- Program alteration (such as creating software that is insecure)
- Inadequate staff training
- Inadequate security policies and procedures
- Staff shortages or strikes

**Data/Database Administrator**
- Inadequate security policies and procedures
Scope of Data Security Needs

- Must protect databases & the servers on which they reside.
- Must administer & protect the rights of internal database users.
- Must guarantee the confidentiality of ecommerce customers as they access the database.
- With the Internet continually growing, the threat to data traveling over the network increases exponentially.
Introduction to Database Security

Issues (4)

- Threats to databases:
  - Loss of **integrity**
  - Loss of **availability**
  - Loss of **confidentiality**

- To protect databases against these types of threats four kinds of countermeasures can be implemented:
  - Access control
  - Inference control
  - Flow control
  - Encryption
A DBMS typically includes a database security and authorization subsystem that is responsible for ensuring the security portions of a database against unauthorized access.

Two types of database security mechanisms:

- **Discretionary** security mechanisms
- **Mandatory** security mechanisms
The security mechanism of a DBMS must include provisions for restricting access to the database as a whole.

- This function is called **access control** and is handled by creating user accounts and passwords to control login process by the DBMS.
The security problem associated with databases is that of controlling the access to a **statistical database**, which is used to provide statistical information or summaries of values based on various criteria.

- The countermeasures to **statistical database security** problem is called **inference control measures**.
Another security is that of **flow control**, which prevents information from flowing in such a way that it reaches unauthorized users.

Channels that are pathways for information to flow implicitly in ways that violate the security policy of an organization are called **covert channels**.
A final security issue is **data encryption**, which is used to protect sensitive data (such as credit card numbers) that is being transmitted via some type communication network.

The data is **encoded** using some **encoding algorithm**.

- An unauthorized user who access encoded data will have difficulty deciphering it, but authorized users are given decoding or decrypting algorithms (or keys) to decipher data.
Database Security and the DBA (1)

- The database administrator (DBA) is the central authority for managing a database system.
  - The DBA’s responsibilities include:
    - granting privileges to users who need to use the system.
    - classifying users and data in accordance with the policy of the organization.
- The DBA is responsible for the overall security of the database system.
The DBA has a DBA account in the DBMS:

- Sometimes these are called a system or superuser account.
- These accounts provide powerful capabilities such as:
  1. Account creation
  2. Privilege granting
  3. Privilege revocation
  4. Security level assignment

- Action 1 is access control, whereas 2 and 3 are discretionary and 4 is used to control mandatory authorization.
Whenever a person or group of persons need to access a database system, the individual or group must first apply for a user account. The DBA will then create a new account id and password for the user if he/she deems there is a legitimate need to access the database.

The user must log in to the DBMS by entering account id and password whenever database access is needed.
Access Protection, User Accounts, and Database Audits (2)

- The database system must also keep track of all operations on the database that are applied by a certain user throughout each login session.

- To keep a record of all updates applied to the database and of the particular user who applied each update, we can modify system log, which includes an entry for each operation applied to the database that may be required for recovery from a transaction failure or system crash.
If any tampering with the database is suspected, a database audit is performed.

A database audit consists of reviewing the log to examine all accesses and operations applied to the database during a certain time period.

A database log that is used mainly for security purposes is sometimes called an audit trail.
Contents

1 Introduction to Database Security Issues
2 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
3 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
4 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
5 Encryption & PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

- User can protect what they own.
- Owner may grant access to other.
- Owner can define the type of access (read/write/execute/...) given to others.

The typical method of enforcing discretionary access control in a database system is based on the granting and revoking privileges.
Types of Discretionary Privileges (1)

- The **account level**:  
  - At this level, the DBA specifies the particular privileges that each account holds independently of the relations in the database.

- The **relation level** (or **table level**):  
  - At this level, the DBA can control the privilege to access each individual relation or view in the database.
Types of Discretionary Privileges (2)

- The privileges at the **account level** apply to the capabilities provided to the account itself and can include:
  - the **CREATE SCHEMA** or **CREATE TABLE** privilege, to create a schema or base relation;
  - the **CREATE VIEW** privilege;
  - the **ALTER** privilege, to apply schema changes such as adding or removing attributes from relations;
  - the **DROP** privilege, to delete relations or views;
  - the **MODIFY** privilege, to insert, delete, or update tuples;
  - and the **SELECT** privilege, to retrieve information from the database by using a **SELECT** query.
Types of Discretionary Privileges (3)

- The second level of privileges applies to the relation level
  - This includes base relations and virtual (view) relations.
- In SQL the following types of privileges can be granted on each individual relation R:
  - **SELECT** (retrieval or read) privilege on R:
    - This gives the account retrieval privilege.
    - The **SELECT** statement is used to retrieve tuples from R.
  - **REFERENCES** privilege on R:
    - This gives the account the capability to reference relation R when specifying integrity constraints.
    - The privilege can also be restricted to specific attributes of R.
Types of Discretionary Privileges (4)

In SQL the following types of privileges can be granted on each individual relation R (contd.):

- **MODIFY** privileges on R:
  - This gives the account the capability to modify tuples of R.
  - In SQL this privilege is further divided into **UPDATE**, **DELETE**, and **INSERT** privileges to apply the corresponding SQL command to R.
  - In addition, both the **INSERT** and **UPDATE** privileges can specify that only certain attributes can be updated by the account.

- Notice that to create a **view**, the account must have **SELECT** privilege on all relations involved in the view definition.
The granting and revoking of privileges generally follow an authorization model for discretionary privileges known as the access matrix model where:

- The rows of a matrix $M$ represents subjects (users, accounts, programs).
- The columns represent objects (relations, records, columns, views, operations).
- Each position $M(i,j)$ in the matrix represents the types of privileges (read, write, update) that subject $i$ holds on object $j$. 
## Access matrix model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Oi</th>
<th></th>
<th>Om</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>A[s1,o1]</td>
<td></td>
<td>A[s1,oi]</td>
<td></td>
<td>A[s1,om]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jan - 2015

CuuDuongThanCong.com

https://fb.com/tailieudientucntt
Types of Discretionary Privileges (6)

To control the granting and revoking of relation privileges, for each relation R in a database:

- **The owner of a relation is given all privileges on that relation.**

- The owner account holder can **pass privileges** on any of the owned relation to other users by granting privileges to their accounts.

- The owner account holder can also **take back the privileges** by revoking privileges from their accounts.
The mechanism of **views** is an important discretionary authorization mechanism in its own right.

- If the owner A of a relation R wants another account B to be able to **retrieve only some fields** of R, then A can **create a view** V of R that includes **only those attributes** and then grant SELECT on V to B.

- The same applies to limiting B to retrieving **only certain tuples of** R; a view V’ can be created by defining the view by means of a query that selects only those tuples from R that A wants to allow B to access.
Revoking Privileges

■ In some cases it is desirable to grant a privilege to a user temporarily.
   The owner of a relation may want to grant the SELECT privilege to a user for a specific task and then revoke that privilege once the task is completed.
   Hence, a mechanism for revoking privileges is needed. In SQL, a REVOKE command is included for the purpose of canceling privileges.
Propagation of Privileges using the GRANT OPTION

Whenever the owner A of a relation R grants a privilege on R to another account B, privilege can be given to B with or without the **GRANT OPTION**.

If the **GRANT OPTION** is given, this means that B can also grant that privilege on R to other accounts.

- Suppose that B is given the **GRANT OPTION** by A and that B then grants the privilege on R to a third account C, also with **GRANT OPTION**. In this way, privileges on R can **propagate** to other accounts without the knowledge of the owner of R.
- If the owner account **A now revokes** the privilege granted to B, **all the privileges that B propagated** based on that privilege should automatically **be revoked** by the system.
Limiting the horizontal propagation

```
A1
  ↓
  Grant with horizontal propagation i = 2
  ↓
A2
  Grant
  ↓
A3
  Grant
  ↓
A4
```

i = 2
Limiting the vertical propagation

A1

Grant with vertical propagation
j = 2

A2

Grant with j = 1

Grant with j = 0

A3

Grant with j = 0

A5

A4

Grant with j = 0

A6

j = 2
An Example (1)

- Suppose that the DBA creates four accounts:
  - A1, A2, A3, A4
- and wants only A1 to be able to create base relations. Then the DBA must issue the following GRANT command in SQL:
  \[
  \text{GRANT CREATETAB TO A1;}
  \]
- In SQL2 the same effect can be accomplished by having the DBA issue a CREATE SCHEMA command as follows:
  \[
  \text{CREATE SCHEMA EXAMPLE AUTHORIZATION A1;}
  \]
An Example (2)

- User account **A1 can create tables** under the schema called **EXAMPLE**.

- Suppose that A1 **creates** the two base relations **EMPLOYEE** and **DEPARTMENT**:
  - A1 is then **owner** of these two relations and hence **all the relation privileges** on each of them.

- Suppose that A1 wants to grant A2 the privilege to insert and delete tuples in both of these relations, but A1 does not want A2 to be able to propagate these privileges to additional accounts:

  **GRANT INSERT, DELETE ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO A2;**
### EMPLOYEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ssn</th>
<th>Bdate</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Dno</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### DEPARTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dnumber</th>
<th>Dname</th>
<th>Mgr_ssn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Figure 24.1**

Schemas for the two relations EMPLOYEE and DEPARTMENT.
Suppose that A1 wants to allow A3 to retrieve information from either of the two tables and also to be able to propagate the SELECT privilege to other accounts.

A1 can issue the command:

```
GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO A3 WITH GRANT OPTION;
```

A3 can grant the SELECT privilege on the EMPLOYEE relation to A4 by issuing:

```
GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE TO A4;
```

- Notice that A4 can’t propagate the SELECT privilege because GRANT OPTION was not given to A4.
Suppose that A1 decides to revoke the SELECT privilege on the EMPLOYEE relation from A3; A1 can issue:

```sql
REVOKE SELECT ON EMPLOYEE FROM A3;
```

The DBMS must now **automatically revoke** the SELECT privilege on EMPLOYEE from A4, too, because A3 granted that privilege to A4 and A3 does not have the privilege any more.
An Example (6)

- Suppose that A1 wants to give back to A3 a limited capability to SELECT from the EMPLOYEE relation and wants to allow A3 to be able to propagate the privilege.
  - The limitation is to retrieve only the NAME, BDATE, and ADDRESS attributes and only for the tuples with DNO=5.

- A1 then create the view:

```
CREATE VIEW A3_EMPLOYEE AS
    SELECT NAME, BDATE, ADDRESS
    FROM EMPLOYEE WHERE DNO = 5;
```

- After the view is created, A1 can grant SELECT on the view A3_EMPLOYEE to A3 as follows:

```
GRANT SELECT ON A3EMPLOYEE TO A3
    WITH GRANT OPTION;
```
Finally, suppose that A1 wants to allow A4 to update only the SALARY attribute of EMPLOYEE;

A1 can issue:

```
GRANT UPDATE ON EMPLOYEE (SALARY) TO A4;
```

- The **UPDATE** or **INSERT** privilege can specify particular attributes that may be updated or inserted in a relation.
- Other privileges (**SELECT**, **DELETE**) are **not** attribute specific.
Inherent weakness of DAC

- Unrestricted DAC allows information from an object which can be read by a subject to be written to any other object
  - Bob is denied access to file Y, so he asks cohort Alice to copy Y to X that he can access.

- Suppose our users are trusted not to do this deliberately. It is still possible for Trojan Horses to copy information from one object to another.
Trojan horse Example (1)

User Alice

File A

r: Alice; w: Alice

User Bob

File B

r: Bob; w: Bob

User Bob cannot read the file A!
Trojan horse Example (2)

User Alice

Pgm X

User Bob

TH

r: Alice; w: Alice

File A

r: Bob; w: Bob, Alice

File B
Trojan horse Example (3)

User Alice

User Bob

Pgm X

TH

Read

Write

r: Alice; w: Alice

File A

r: Bob; w: Bob, Alice

File B

User Bob can read contents of file A copied to file B
## Contents

1. Introduction to Database Security Issues
2. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
3. **Mandatory Access Control (MAC)**
4. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
5. Encryption & PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)

---

Jan - 2015

CuuDuongThanCong.com

https://fb.com/tailieudientucntt
Mandatory Access Control

- Granting access to the data on the basis of users’ clearance level and the sensitivity level of the data.
- Bell-LaPadula’s two principles: no read-up & no write-down secrecy.
Bell-LaPadula Model

- Typical **security classes** are *top secret* (TS), *secret* (S), *confidential* (C), and *unclassified* (U), where TS is the highest level and U is the lowest one: TS ≥ S ≥ C ≥ U

- Two restrictions are enforced on data access based on the subject/object classifications:
  - A subject S is not allowed read access to an object O unless class(S) ≥ class(O). This is known as the **simple security property**.
  - A subject S is not allowed to write an object O unless class(S) ≤ class(O). This known as the **star property** (or * property).
Why star property?

User Alice

User Bob

Pgm X

File A

r: Alice; w: Alice

r: Bob; w: Bob, Alice

File B
Why star property?

User Alice

Pgm X

Read

File A

r: Alice; w: Alice

User Bob

TH

Write

File B

r: Bob; w: Bob, Alice

User Bob can read contents of file A copied to file B
Why star property?

- User Alice
  - Level (A) = Secret
  - Level (B) = Unclass

- Pgm X

- Star property
  - r: Alice; w: Alice
  - File A (Secret)
  - File B (Unclass)

- r: Bob; w: Bob, Alice
Multilevel relation (1)

- **Multilevel relation**: MAC + relational database model.
- **Data objects**: attributes and tuples.
- Each attribute A is associated with a **classification attribute C**.
- A **tuple classification** attribute TC is to provide a classification for each tuple as a whole, the highest of all attribute classification values.
  \[ R(A_1,C_1,A_2,C_2, \ldots, A_n,C_n,TC) \]

- The **apparent key** of a multilevel relation is the set of attributes that would have formed the primary key in a regular (single-level) relation.
A multilevel relation will appear to contain different data to subjects (users) with different security levels.
Multilevel relation (3)

```sql
SELECT * FROM EMPLOYEE
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>JobPerformance</th>
<th>TC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith U</td>
<td>40000 C</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown C</td>
<td>80000 S</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

➤ A user with security level S:
Multilevel relation (4)

**SELECT * FROM EMPLOYEE**

**EMPLOYEE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>JobPerformance</th>
<th>TC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith U</td>
<td>40000 C</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown C</td>
<td>80000 S</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

➤ A user with security level C:

**EMPLOYEE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>JobPerformance</th>
<th>TC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith U</td>
<td>40000 C</td>
<td>NULL</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown C</td>
<td>NULL C</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Multilevel relation (5)

A user with security level U:

```
SELECT * FROM EMPLOYEE
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>JobPerformance</th>
<th>TC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith U</td>
<td>40000 C</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown C</td>
<td>80000 S</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>JobPerformance</th>
<th>TC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith U</td>
<td>NULL</td>
<td>NULL</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Properties of Multilevel relation (1)

- **Read and write operations**: satisfy the No Read-Up and No Write-Down principles.

  cuu duong than cong . com

  cuu duong than cong . com
Properties of Multilevel relation (2)

- **Entity integrity:** all attributes that are members of the apparent key must not be null and must have the same security classification within each individual tuple.

- In addition, all other attribute values in the tuple must have a security classification greater than or equal to that of the apparent key.

  This constraint ensures that a user can see the key if the user is permitted to see any part of the tuple at all.
Properties of Multilevel relation (3)

- **Polyinstantiation:** where several tuples can have the same apparent key value but have different attribute values for users at different classification levels.
Polyinstantiation example (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>JobPerformance</th>
<th>TC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>40000 C</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>80000 S</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

➢ A user with security level C:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>JobPerformance</th>
<th>TC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>40000 C</td>
<td>NULL</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>NULL</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Polyinstantiation example (2)

A user with security level C:

```
UPDATE EMPLOYEE
SET Job_performance = 'Excellent'
WHERE Name = 'Smith';
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>JobPerformance</th>
<th>TC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>40000</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>40000</td>
<td>Excellent C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>80000</td>
<td>Good C</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Polyinstantiation of the Smith tuple.
Comparing DAC and MAC (1)

- Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies are characterized by a high degree of flexibility, which makes them suitable for a large variety of application domains.

  - The main drawback of DAC models is their vulnerability to malicious attacks, such as Trojan horses embedded in application programs.
Comparing DAC and MAC (2)

- By contrast, mandatory policies ensure a high degree of protection in a way, they prevent any illegal flow of information.
- Mandatory policies have the drawback of being too rigid and they are only applicable in limited environments.
- In many practical situations, discretionary policies are preferred because they offer a better trade-off between security and applicability.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction to Database Security Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Discretionary Access Control (DAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mandatory Access Control (MAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Encryption &amp; PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Role-Based Access Control (1)

- **Role-based access control (RBAC)** emerged rapidly in the 1990s as a proven technology for managing and enforcing security in large-scale enterprisewide systems.

- Its basic notion is that permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned to appropriate roles.

- Roles can be created using the **CREATE ROLE** and **DESTROY ROLE** commands.
  - The **GRANT** and **REVOKE** commands discussed under DAC can then be used to assign and revoke privileges from roles.
Role-Based Access Control (2)

- RBAC appears to be a viable alternative to traditional discretionary and mandatory access controls; it ensures that only authorized users are given access to certain data or resources.
- Many DBMSs have allowed the concept of roles, where privileges can be assigned to roles.
- Role hierarchy in RBAC is a natural way of organizing roles to reflect the organization’s lines of authority and responsibility.
Role-Based Access Control (3)

- Another important consideration in RBAC systems is the possible temporal constraints that may exist on roles, such as time and duration of role activations, and timed triggering of a role by an activation of another role.

- Using an RBAC model is highly desirable goal for addressing the key security requirements of Web-based applications.

- In contrast, discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) models lack capabilities needed to support the security requirements emerging enterprises and Web-based applications.
Contents

1  Introduction to Database Security Issues
2  Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
3  Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
4  Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
5  Encryption & PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
Encryption (1)

- The encoding of the data by a special algorithm that renders the data unreadable by any program without the decryption key.
- Symmetric cryptography: sender and receiver use the same key.
- Asymmetric cryptography: encryption & decryption keys.
Encryption (2)

- **Plaintext** is the original content which is readable as textual material. Plaintext needs protecting.

- **Ciphertext** is the result of encryption performed on plaintext using an algorithm. Ciphertext is not readable.

- **Cryptosystems** = encryption + decryption algorithms.

- Encryption, decryption process needs **keys**.
Encryption (3)

- **Symmetric (shared-/secret-key) cryptosystem**: the same key for (en/de)cryption algorithms (\(K_E = K_D\)).
- **Asymmetric (public-key) cryptosystem**: public & private keys (\(K_E \neq K_D\)).
Encryption (4)

- (Most popular) Symmetric techniques: DES, AES.
  - The same key is used for both encryption and decryption.
  - Faster than encryption and decryption in public-key (PK) cryptosystems.
  - Less security comparing to encryption and decryption in PK cryptosystems.

- Asymmetric techniques: RSA, DSA.
Symmetric techniques (1)

- **DES: Data Encryption Standard**
  - A message is divided into 64-bit blocks
  - Key: 56 bits
  - Brute-force or exhaustive key search attacks: Some hours.

- **Triple DES**: run the DES algorithm a multiple number of times using different keys
  - $m$: plaintext; $c$: ciphertext
  - $\mathcal{E}_{k_1}$: encryption by key $k_1$; $\mathcal{D}_{k_1}$: decryption by key $k_1$;
  - Encryption: \( c \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_{k_1}(\mathcal{D}_{k_2}(\mathcal{E}_{k_1}(m))) \)
  - Decryption: \( m \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{k_1}(\mathcal{E}_{k_2}(\mathcal{D}_{k_1}(c))) \)
  - Be compatible with DES when $k_1=k_2$;
  - The triple DES can also use three different keys.
Symmetric techniques (2)

- **AES: Advanced Encryption Standard (Rijndael)**
  - Jan 2, 1997, NIST announced the initiation of a new symmetric-key block cipher algorithm, AES, as the new encryption standard to replace the DES.
  - Oct 2, 2000: Rijndael was selected. Rijndael is designed by two Belgium cryptographers: Daemen and Rijmen.

- Rijndael is a block cipher with a variable block size and variable key size.

- The key size and the block size can be independently specified to 128, 192 or 256 bits.
Asymmetric techniques (1)

- **RSA**: named after 3 inventors Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
  - Two keys: public key and private key
  - Public key is used for encryption.
  - Private key is used for decryption
Asymmetric techniques (2)

- Encryption key: public key
- Decryption key: private key
- Asymmetric techniques: more secure but expensive in terms of computational costs
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) (1)
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) (2)

- How does PKI work?
Digital Signatures

- A **digital signature** is an example of using encryption techniques to provide authentication services in e-commerce applications.
- A digital signature is a means of associating a mark unique to an individual with a body of text.
  - The mark should be unforgettable, meaning that others should be able to check that the signature does come from the originator.
- A digital signature consists of a string of symbols.
  - Signature must be different for each use.
    - This can be achieved by making each digital signature a function of the message that it is signing, together with a time stamp.
  - Public key techniques are the means creating digital signatures.
How digital signature works?

1. **Original Text**
   - Memo: Confidential
   - Re: Fiscal Review
   - This quarter's earnings have just come in and...

2. **Signing**
   - private key
   - signed text

3. **Verified Text**
   - Memo: Confidential
   - Re: Fiscal Review
   - This quarter's earnings have just come in and...
   - verified text

- public key

---

Jan - 2015

CuuDuongThanCong.com

https://fb.com/tailieudientucntt
Digital certificates

- One concern with the public key approach: must ensure that you are encrypting to the correct person’s public key.
  - Otherwise, you can only encrypt/decrypt to those key handed to you.

- A solution: digital certificates (or certs).
- A form of credentials (like a physical passport).
- Included with a person’s public key to verify that a key is valid.
Components of a digital certificate

- A digital certificate
  - A public key
  - Certificate info (identifying information such as name, ID)
  - One (or more) digital signatures
  - A stamp of approval from a trusted entity

Certificates are used when it is necessary to exchange public keys with someone (when you cannot manually exchange via a diskette or USB drive).
# Summary

1. Introduction to Database Security Issues
2. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
3. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
4. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
5. Encryption & PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
Q & A